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Introduction 
Throughout the 2016 presidential race, public displays of support 
for Donald Trump’s candidacy on college campuses elicited strong 
reactions from droves of offended students. Minority students felt 
targeted by Mr. Trump’s campaign—as well as by members of the 
campus community who supported him—and called for administrators 
to respond. At Ohio University (“OU”), fraternity members painted 
“Trump 2016” and “Build the Wall!!” on a popular graffiti wall on 
campus—a place where individuals and student organizations create 
artwork and advertise their organizations and events.1 The painting 
elicited backlash from the university community, many members of 
which felt that the message was derogatory towards immigrants and 
 
1. Megan Henry, Greek Week Events Altered After Members Paint “Build the 
Wall”, The Post (Sept. 14, 2016, 9:20 PM), http://www.thepostathens.com/ 
article/2016/04/greek-week-events-altered-after-members-painted-build-the-
wall [https://perma.cc/58TT-7WCW]. 
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people of Latin American heritage.2 Although the university did not 
formally sanction the students involved, the incident led to the can-
cellation of many Greek Week activities.3 
Months later, as the election approached, another image appeared. 
This time, the slogan “Build the Wall” was accompanied by the image 
of a hangman.4 The individuals responsible for this display were never 
identified, but their message provoked strong responses condemning 
this kind of expression on a college campus.5 University officials 
characterized the incidents—and the purpose of the wall in general—as 
a means by which the community could learn the power of words and 
images.6 
Similarly, at Emory University, students spoke out against sidewalk 
chalkings supporting Trump as targeting students of color.7 In the wake 
of Mr. Trump’s victory, similar incidents have occurred on campuses 
across the United States.8 
Although the universities did not formally sanction anyone in either 
instance, the uproar raises questions concerning the extent of these 
students’ First Amendment rights and the demand for safe spaces on 
campus. Chalkings similar to those at Emory appeared on campus side-
walks across the country and sparked a national debate concerning free 
speech and inclusion on college campuses.9 Today, college adminis-




4. Images Depicting a Hanged Figure, ‘Build the Wall’ Appear on Graffiti Wall 
at Ohio University, The Post (Sept. 20, 2016, 9:10 AM), http:// 
www.thepostathens.com/article/2016/09/ohio-university-graffiti-wall-build-




7. Susan Svrluga, Someone Wrote ‘Trump 2016’ on Emory’s Campus in Chalk. 
Some Students Say They No Longer Feel Safe., Wash. Post (Mar. 24 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/ 
03/24/someone-wrote-trump-2016-on-emorys-campus-in-chalk-some-students-
said-they-no-longer-feel-safe/ [https://perma.cc/5HY4-MF9T]. Emory is a private 
university, but these events reflect those occurring on campuses across the United 
States. 
8. Katherine Knott & Shannon Najmadabi, Traumatized and Indignant, College 
Students React to a Trump Presidency, Chron. Higher Educ. (Nov. 9, 
2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/TraumatizedIndignant/ 
238357?cid=cp65 [https://perma.cc/4NAQ-4H3M]. 
9. Katie Rogers, Pro-Trump Chalk Messages Cause Conflict on College Campuses, 
N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
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college and university campuses, as state actors, have limited tools with 
which to respond to these concerns without infringing upon students’ 
free speech rights,10 and administrators across the country are currently 
grappling with how to do so.11 
This Note will explore the options available to public colleges and 
universities to respond to this kind of personal political expression on 
campus in the form of leafleting, chalking, or painting spaces such as 
the OU graffiti wall.12 Part I will consider where these spaces fit within 
the public forum doctrine and the different First Amendment standards 
courts apply depending upon the type of forum at issue. Part II will 
examine the ways in which colleges and universities have attempted to 
respond to the backlash against pro-Trump speech on campus. Part II 
will also examine the implications of student-driven restrictions on 
speech. Part III will argue that the OU graffiti wall, like sidewalks, are 
designated public fora; therefore, courts should review restrictions on 
expression in these fora with strict scrutiny. Part IV will discuss the 
public policy rationales supporting the application of strict scrutiny on 
restrictions on expression in the context of public higher education. Part 
IV will also examine and dismiss potential legal and public policy 
arguments that, although these spaces are designated public fora, this 
type of speech is not protected due to its content. 
I. The Public Forum Doctrine 
This Part will provide background concerning how courts analyze 




10. See U.S. Const. amend. I; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 




12. This Note is limited to a discussion of public college and university campuses, as 
private colleges and universities are not state actors and therefore not subject to 
the First Amendment. Public and private colleges also argue that their non-profit 
status requires them to restrict political speech. The IRS regulations are clear, 
however, that it is the institution’s speech—not the individual students’ speech—
that is restricted by the tax code. See Rev. Rul. 72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246 (“The 
provision of facilities and faculty advisors for a campus newspaper that publishes 
the students’ editorial opinions on political and legislative matters does not 
constitute an attempt by the university to influence legislation or participate in 
political campaigns.”); see also Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (listing 21 
hypothetical situations in which a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit has or has not 
“participat[ed] or intervene[ed], directly or indirectly, in any political campaign 
on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office”). 
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First Amendment is not absolute, and courts consider where the 
expression occurs in analyzing permissible restrictions. The Supreme 
Court provides verbal constructions for each type of forum—public, 
designated public, limited public, and nonpublic—as well as the stand-
ards by which courts should review restrictions on expression in each 
forum. This Note will focus specifically on those standards applied in 
cases involving public schools. 
A. Public Fora 
Traditional public fora are the spaces in which courts provide the 
most protection to individuals alleging their right to free expression has 
been restricted. They are “places which by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,” in which “the 
rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circum-
scribed.”13 These spaces are used in the democratic tradition of free 
assembly and debate amongst citizens on public questions.14 The semi-
nal examples of public fora are streets and parks.15 
Although public college and university campuses are owned by a 
state actor, courts have not held entire public campuses to be public 
fora.16 Each space on the campus must meet the definition of a public 
forum described above, a standard which has proven difficult to meet.17 
In both Perry and Hershey, plaintiffs argued that certain spaces in 
public schools were public fora, and in both cases the court disagreed.18 
In Perry, the parties debated how to apply forum analysis in the 
context of a public school district’s interschool mail system and teacher 
mailboxes. The school district entered into an exclusive collective 
bargaining agreement with a union, and a rival union sued on the 
grounds that the school district violated its free speech rights by pro-
hibiting its use of the interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes.19 
The Supreme Court held that the mailboxes were not public fora 
because “there [was] no indication in the record that the school mail-
boxes and interschool delivery system [were] open for use by the general 
public.”20 
 
13. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
14. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
15. Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
16. Id. at 509. 
17. See id. (explaining that many cases refused to hold entire college campuses to 
be traditional public forums).  
18. 460 U.S. at 47; 938 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
19. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39. 
20. Id. at 47.  
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The Court in Perry came to this decision based on a tripartite 
framework that identified public, limited public, and non-public fora as 
calling for different standards of review.21 Subsequently, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the 
framework in Perry to a case arising on a public college campus. 
In Hershey, plaintiff Richard Hershey was an advocate of 
vegetarianism who was arrested after attempting to pass out leaflets on 
the sidewalk on the campus of Lehman College.22 Hershey was not a 
student at Lehman.23 Campus security removed Hershey from the 
campus sidewalk, and he argued that this action deprived him of his 
right to free expression because the sidewalk was a public forum.24 The 
district court disagreed and, using the Perry framework, explained that 
public college and university campuses are public fora only when the 
administration intentionally opens these spaces for use by the general 
public.25 
If a space is a public forum, then state actors have limited means 
to restrict expression in the space. In the realm of the public forum, 
content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest.26 Reasonable “time, place, and manner re-
strictions” are permissible as long as they are “content-neutral” and 
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave 
open ample alternative means of communication.”27 Status as a public 
forum is not the only means by which expression in a space may war-
rant this strict standard of review. 
 
21. See infra Parts I.B and I.C (discussing limited public and nonpublic fora). 
22. 938 F. Supp. 2d at 499. Lehman College is a public liberal arts college and part 
of the City University of New York system. Id. 
23. See id. at 503 (“Lehman . . . had an unwritten policy prohibiting outsiders from 
leafleting on campus.”). 
24. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court has held that not all sidewalks are public fora. 
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that the sidewalk 
outside a post office is not a public forum); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828 (1976) (upholding a ban on political activities and distribution of campaign 
literature on a military base even though public roads traversed the base). 
25. Hershey, 938 F. Supp. at 508. The court ultimately held that the public 
sidewalk surrounding Lehman’s campus constituted a public forum and denied 
the college’s motion to dismiss Hershey’s claims relating to leafleting in that 
space. Id. at 514. 
26. Id. at 506. See also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”). 
27. Hershey, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). 
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B. Limited and Designated Public Fora 
Spaces on public college and university campuses are more likely 
designated or limited public fora than they are public fora because such 
spaces are open to students to express themselves as members of the 
campus community. A designated public forum is space that a state 
actor has intentionally opened to the general public for the purpose of 
serving as a public forum.28 A limited public forum is similar, but occurs 
when a state actor opens what would otherwise be considered a non-
public forum for use by a specific group of people29 or for a limited 
purpose.30 
In Hershey, the court determined that the on-campus space where 
plaintiff attempted to leaflet was a limited public forum open only to 
members of the university community.31 In making this determination, 
the court emphasized the purpose of the property in question, stating 
that “a college campus serves a narrower purpose [than a traditional 
public forum], and outside visitors are not automatically welcomed as 
invitees, as at a shopping mall, but are more properly viewed as ‘classic 
licensees,’ subject to reasonable restrictions.”32 These restrictions are 
subject to a lower standard of review than those applicable to public 
fora—they need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of 
the forum’s purpose which, in this case and in the spaces that are the 
subject of this Note, is education.33 
In Roberts v. Haragan,34 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas faced a fact pattern similar to the one in 
Hershey, but the speaker was a student. Plaintiff Jason Roberts was a 
student at Texas Tech University Law School who wanted to pass out 
literature on campus about his religious and political views—the 
content of which expressly condemned homosexuality.35 The school’s 
policy required Roberts to request permission for his activities, but 
 
28. Id. at 507; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
29. Hershey, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
30. Id. at 510 (noting that college campuses serve a narrower purpose than other 
spaces, such as airport terminals which may serve as both an airport and a 
shopping mall). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (citing Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
33. Id. at 508. 
34. 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
35. Id. at 856. 
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when he did so, his request was denied.36 The court held that “to the 
extent the campus has park areas, sidewalks, streets, or other similar 
common areas, these areas are public for[a], at least for the University’s 
students.”37 As a result of this finding, content-based restrictions on 
speech in these areas are subject to strict scrutiny.38 
In the case of Widmar v. Vincent,39 the Supreme Court considered 
the applicable standard for restricting speech in a limited public forum. 
Like in Roberts, the Widmar plaintiffs were members of the community 
to whom the space was opened: students at the university, rather than 
outside activists. The student organization in Widmar sought to con-
tinue its use of university facilities for religious activities and discussion 
which it had been doing before the university implemented a regulation 
prohibiting use of school buildings or grounds for religious purposes.40 
Because the individuals seeking to use the space for expressive activity 
were among those to whom the forum was open, the Court held that 
any content-based restriction would only be upheld if it was necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end41—the same standard courts use to evaluate restrictions on expres-
sion in public fora.42 In that case, the school’s interest was complying 
with its constitutional obligations under the Establishment Clause, 
which the Court admitted was compelling.43 However, the Court still 
declined to uphold the restriction because it was not necessary to 
uphold the state interest.44 “[I]n the absence of empirical evidence that 
religious groups will dominate [the university]’s open forum, we agree 
with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum’s ‘primary effect.’”45 
C. Nonpublic Fora 
Nonpublic fora exist where public property is neither traditionally 
used as a place in which individuals share ideas, nor has a state actor 
 
36. Id. at 856–57. Roberts’ request was granted on administrative appeal, but he 
challenged the University’s policy requiring permission in the first place as 
unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 857–58. 
37. Id. at 861. 
38. Id. at 862. 
39. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
40. Id. at 265. 
41. Id. at 267, 270. 
42. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
43. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271. 
44. Id. at 276.  
45. Id. at 275. 
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designated it as such.46 Examples of nonpublic fora include airport 
terminals, sports stadiums, military bases, and jailhouse grounds.47 
State actors have more power to restrict speech in these fora than in 
any of the previous three. “In addition to time, place, and manner 
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”48 
II. Colleges and Universities Respond 
This Part will examine the ways in which public colleges and 
universities have traditionally responded to offensive speech through 
student codes of conduct. It will also examine how higher education 
administrators are experimenting with new tools in order to respond to 
recent incidents. 
A. Speech Codes 
Speech codes are the incarnation of one of a college or university’s 
most integral and unpleasant functions: discipline.49 It is also the arena 
in which colleges and universities pose the greatest threat to the 
individual rights of students.50 Federal courts have held that colleges 
and universities have the right to enact reasonable rules governing 
student conduct.51 
Prior to the “Build the Wall” incident at Ohio University, a student 
challenged the university’s speech code in federal court on the grounds 
 
46. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
47. Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
48. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic 
Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)). 
49. Provisions of Title IX-mandated college and university sexual harassment codes 
that may infringe on free expression are outside the scope of this Note. 
50. See generally RICHARD C. RATLIFF, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
COLLEGE STUDENTS (1972) (studying the state of student rights on campus 
ten years after Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education which guaranteed 
students some degree of due process rights in campus disciplinary proceedings). 
51. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972) (“[A] college has the inherent 
power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power to 
properly discipline . . . that it may expect that its students adhere to generally 
accepted standards of conduct.” (quoting Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 
F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969))). 
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that certain provisions had a chilling effect on free speech.52 The uni-
versity ultimately settled the lawsuit and paid the plaintiff $32,000 in 
damages.53 Ohio University’s speech code has since been amended, and 
the analogous provision in the current code specifically prohibits harass-
ment, discrimination, and retaliation with repetitious references to the 
First Amendment.54 However, not all public colleges and universities 
have similarly narrow codes. 
According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
(“FIRE”), of the 345 public colleges and universities it surveyed in 2017, 
33.9% employed speech codes that warranted a “Red Light” rating 
under its methodology.55 According to FIRE, a Red Light speech code 
is one that “clearly and substantially restrict[s] freedom of speech,” 
meaning that “the threat to free speech . . . is obvious on the face of 
the policy and does not depend on how the policy is applied” and “is 
broadly applicable to campus expression.”56 The “Build the Wall” and 
“Trump 2016” displays at public universities employing these more re-
strictive codes could serve as a tool for universities to curtail this 
controversial speech; however, these restrictions are likely to be found 
unconstitutional if challenged in court.57 
 
52. Complaint, Smith v. McDavis, No. 2:14-CV-670 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2017) 
(alleging that the “Harm to Others” provision of the 2014 version of the Ohio 
University Student Code of Conduct had a chilling effect on free speech because 
it was overly broad in forbidding any act that “demeans, degrades, or disgraces” 
another). 
53. Collin Binkley, Ohio University Settles Free-speech Lawsuit Over Suggestive  
T-shirt, Columbus Dispatch (Feb. 3, 2015 8:40AM), http://www. 
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/02/02/Ohio_University_settles_free
_speech_lawsuit.html# [https://perma.cc/4857-MYRF] (“Ohio Uni- 
versity agreed to pay $32,000 in a settlement with a student who sued.”). 
54. Ohio University, Student Code of Conduct 8 (2015), https:// 
www.ohio.edu/communitystandards/upload/Ohio-University-Student-Code-of-
Conduct-effective-081915.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ8T-42V7] (last visited Mar. 
19, 2017). 
55. Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Spotlight on 
Speech Codes 7 (2017) [hereinafter Spotlight on Speech Codes], 
https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ 
12115009/SCR_2017_Full-Cover_Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/B76M-
EZUF] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Id. at 11; see infra Parts III and IV (arguing sidewalks and spaces like the OU 
graffiti wall are limited public fora as to students, therefore restrictions on 
expression in these spaces should be construed narrowly). 
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B. Bias Response Teams and Student-Driven Speech Restrictions 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the recent calls for more 
restriction on campus speech is that they originate not with adminis-
trators, but with students.58 In the case of the Ohio University graffiti 
wall, it was students who painted over the messages they found 
offensive and students who called for a response on campus.59 A 
common response amongst universities has been to create an adminis-
trative procedure by which students with this type of grievance may 
report it to the administration.60 
According to one administrator, a bias incident response team is 
meant to “funnel those [student] complaints to a central source and 
then to disseminate them out to the appropriate parties.”61 The Ohio 
State University was one of the first institutions to create a bias 
response team;62 the Ohio State University Bias Assessment and 
Response Team was created in 2006.63 The stated mission of this team 
is to serve as a voluntary mechanism for community members to report 
bias incidents, and to refer them to other departments, such as the 
 
58. Conor Friedersdorf, The Glaring Evidence That Free Speech Is Threatened on 
Campus, Atlantic (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2016/03/the-glaring-evidence-that-free-speech-is-threatened-
on-campus/471825/ [https://perma.cc/WW63-69JT]. See also Greg 
Lukianoff, Freedom From Speech (2014) (arguing that academia will 
continue to see calls to disinvite controversial campus speakers and establish 
safe zones as part of a global trend favoring intellectual comfort over free 
speech). 
59. Henry, supra note 1; Build the Wall, supra note 4. 
60. Jake New, Defending BARTs, Inside Higher Ed (Sept. 12, 2016), https:// 
www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/12/despite-recent-criticism-college 
-officials-say-bias-response-teams-fill-important [https://perma.cc/4NQD-
XZEW] (“‘There has clearly been an increase in campuses creating both bias 
response teams in addition to a more clearly defined process for how members of 
the campus community can report an incident of bias,’ Kevin Kruger, president 
of NASPA: Student Affairs Administrators in Higher Education, said.”). 
61. Nadia Dreid, Amid Concerns About Stifling Speech, Colleges Take a New Look 
at Bias-Response Teams, Chron. Higher Educ. (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Amid-Concerns-About-Stifling/237918 
[https://perma.cc/EWN9-ZF5F] (quoting Kevin Bailey, student affairs 
professional at the University of West Florida). 
62. Rio Fernandes, In a Charged Climate, Colleges Adopt Bias-Response 
Teams, Chron. Higher Educ. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.chronicle. 
com/article/In-a-Charged-Climate-Colleges/235120 [https://perma.cc/ 
8ZEU-83TQ]. 
63. Ohio State University Office of Student Life, History of the Bias Assessment 
and Response Team, http://www.studentaffairs.osu.edu/bias/history-of-
bart.aspx [https://perma.cc/EP9C-RBLC] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
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student conduct office, if necessary.64 Schools across the country have 
established similar mechanisms, but at least one school has sub-
sequently disbanded its bias response team due to concerns about the 
chilling effect on free expression.65 
Most formulations of the bias response teams cited in student affairs 
news and literature are composed either of faculty members alone or a 
combination of faculty and staff.66 Considering the rather novel 
situation on college and university campuses in which students are 
calling for restrictions on other students’ free expression, institutions 
may consider creating bias response teams composed at least partly of 
students. However, because any authority these teams have to respond 
to incidents derives from the institution, they would still be considered 
state actors for First Amendment purposes.67 
C. An Alternative Path: The Case of the University of Chicago 
In the midst of this national debate, administrators at the 
University of Chicago took a different approach to the issue of free 
speech on campus. Every member of the freshman class of 2020 received 
a letter from Dean of Students John Ellison indicating the university’s 
policy against the use of trigger warnings and safe spaces.68 The letter 
 
64. Id. 
65. Jeffrey Aaron Snyder & Amna Khalid, The Rise of “Bias Response Teams” on 
Campus, New Republic (Mar. 30, 2016), https://newrepublic. 
com/article/132195/rise-bias-response-teams-campus [https://perma.cc/6W 
UD-RVCQ] (noting that “more than 100 colleges and universities have Bias 
Response Teams”); Dreid, supra note 61 (reporting that the University of Northern 
Colorado disbanded its bias response team). 
66. Snyder, supra note 65.  
67. Although the state-action doctrine is unsettled, it is generally accepted that a 
sufficient nexus between private action and the state action justifies a 
conclusion that state action exists. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State 
Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 508 n.19 (1985) (“Although there are many 
separate tests for determining whether there is sufficient state involvement to 
justify a finding that state action exists, the Court has made clear that the 
overall inquiry is whether there is an adequate nexus between the private 
behavior and the state.”); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 
(1974) (“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the 
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”). Students 
acting in the context of a university-established entity restricting speech likely 
satisfy this test. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–
26 (1961) (holding that the operator of a private restaurant located in a 
municipal parking garage had engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination 
because the restaurant operator was so closely connected with the local 
government that owned the structure). 
68. Pete Grieve, University to Freshmen: Don’t Expect Safe Spaces or Trigger 
Warnings, Chi. Maroon (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.chicagomaroon. 
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reinforced the university’s commitment to academic freedom and 
specifically mentioned that events hosting controversial speakers would 
not be cancelled for that reason.69 
Public response to the letter both on and off campus was mixed. 
Some praised the university for its commitment to creating an educa-
tional space in which the marketplace of ideas can flourish.70 Others 
claimed that the letter prohibited safe spaces and therefore restricted 
professors’ academic freedom to choose to use such tools in their 
classrooms.71 The University of Chicago also received a Green Light 
rating from FIRE for its speech code,72 meaning that its written policies 
do not pose a serious threat to free speech.73 Only 3.8% of the 104 
private schools FIRE surveyed received a similar rating.74 
Although the letter raises issues such as the academic freedom of 
professors, it demonstrates a recognition by the university that students 
on campus have a right to both hear and protest controversial speakers 
and express controversial ideas themselves. In addition, such a policy is 
less likely to result in an impermissible restriction on student speech in 





70. Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, Why the U. of Chicago Is the Universe of 
Common Sense, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-university-chicago-safe-spaces-trigger-
warnings-edit-20160825-story.html [https://perma.cc/AE3P-N4RU] (“An 
editorial in the Chicago Tribune praised the letter as ‘refreshingly direct,’ 
applauding its ‘commitment to the marketplace of ideas, the implicit 
endorsement of democratic freedoms, and the sheer feistiness.’”). 
71. Andy Thomason, U. of Chicago’s Condemning of Safe Spaces and Trigger 
Warnings Reignites Debate, Chron. Higher Educ. (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/u-of-chicagos-condemning-of-safe-
spaces-and-trigger-warnings-reignites-debate/113760 [https://perma.cc/D7Q 
U-946K] (“[D]efenders of trigger warnings and safe spaces have ripped the letter, 
saying its statements actually undermine the ‘commitment to academic freedom’ 
cited as their motivation.”). 
72. Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Spotlight: University of Chicago, 
https://www.thefire.org/schools/university-of-chicago/ [https:// 
perma.cc/XSN8-L6LA] (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
73. Spotlight on Speech Codes, supra note 55, at 5. 
74. Id. at 7. 
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III. The Ohio University Graffiti Wall and Spaces Like 
It Are Limited Public Fora 
For the purposes of free speech analysis, all public property, 
including property owned by state actors such as colleges and uni-
versities, is one of four types of fora: public; limited public; designated 
public; or nonpublic.75 This Part will argue that the most appropriate 
means of analyzing the Ohio University graffiti wall and on-campus 
sidewalks, parks, and streets is by designating them as limited public 
fora; this argument follows the analysis of Hershey, Roberts, and 
Widmar, and is supported by sound public policy in favor of free expres-
sion in an educational environment populated by adult students. 
Widmar concerned a religious student organization that freely 
utilized school facilities at the University of Missouri at Kansas City 
until the school adopted a regulation prohibiting religious worship in 
university buildings or on university grounds.76 As discussed in Part I, 
the Widmar Court concluded that the campus facilities the students 
sought to use were limited public fora and open to student groups.77 
The Court applied the standard applicable to public fora generally: any 
restriction must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.78 
In most of the recent controversies surrounding pro-Trump expres-
sions, the actors have been students or—in cases in which the actors 
were not identified—presumably students.79 Therefore, the strict scru-
tiny standard that the Court applied to the restriction at issue in 
Widmar is the standard most appropriate for restrictions on student 
speech of this kind. 
The court in Hershey also considered the purpose of the space in 
analyzing whether the forum was open to Hershey to leaflet.80 In that 
case, the court determined that the college had a strong interest in 
preserving use of its space and facilities for students for the purpose of 
education.81 Recent use of campus spaces—like sidewalks or the OU 
graffiti wall—to express support for a political candidate are more akin 
to Roberts than to Hershey because the speakers are students. However, 
both cases support the argument that the space is open to students to 
 
75. See supra Part I. 
76. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). 
77. Id. at 267. 
78. Id. at 270. 
79. Henry, supra note 1. 
80. Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
81. Id. 
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further the educational purpose of colleges and universities. Students 
are expressing their political views in these spaces,82 and this expression 
is consistent with the educational mission of a college or university—
developing well-informed citizens.83 
Although the social issues presented by these controversial mes-
sages are pervasive,84 the educational purpose of colleges and uni-
versities favors freedom of expression on campus except in narrow cir-
cumstances.85 Free speech advocates argue that restrictions on campus 
speech affect the nation as a whole because it is the responsibility of 
colleges to develop deep and nuanced thinkers.86 Regulations that have 
a chilling effect on free speech necessarily run counter to that goal. In 
2015, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 
held a hearing concerning First Amendment protections on college 
campuses.87 Jamin Raskin, a longtime law professor at American Uni-
versity, highlighted the policy concerns implicated by restricting 
freedom of expression on college campuses in particular.88 According to 
Raskin, higher education “is the paradigm exemplar of free discourse 
and debate in our vibrant, pluralist, and multicultural democracy. So 
 
82. Henry, supra note 1. 
83. Svrluga, supra note 7 (“Part of being in college is having experiences where you 
question your values, question what you believe.”). 
84. The impact pro-Trump speech—and other offensive or derogatory political 
speech—has on minority students on college campuses is an important issue in 
higher education, and increasing student awareness of its effects should be a 
priority. Much modern First Amendment doctrine grew out of the civil rights 
movement. See generally Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First 
Amendment 6 (1965) (examining “three fresh problems for free-speech theory 
churned up” by the civil rights movement). However, these topics are outside 
the scope of this Note. 
85. See infra Part IV. 
86. See, e.g., Greg Lukianoff, Unlearning Liberty 7–12 (2014) (“Our 
national discussion is dominated by people with a college education. So, if we 
assume that colleges and universities are supposed to make us deeper, more 
creative and nuanced thinkers, we should be enjoying a golden age of American 
discourse.”). Educators make similar arguments. See Derek Bok, Beyond 
the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern 
University 61–91 (1982) (arguing that higher education influences society by 
shaping inquiring minds). 
87. First Amendment Protections on Public College and University Campuses: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter House Subcommittee 
Hearing]. 
88. Id. at 59 (statement of Jamin Raskin, American University Washington College 
of Law). 
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if we have no freedom of thought and speech on campus, it is hard to 
imagine where we are going to have it in the United States.”89 
Scholars have echoed this sentiment since the end of the in loco 
parentis doctrine in higher education in the mid-20th century.90 The 
concept of in loco parentis originated in the English common law as the 
idea that teachers had a share of parental power over their students.91 
The American higher education and legal systems adhered to this 
doctrine in the context of college and university campuses from the 
early years of the nation through the 1960s,92 even after the First 
Amendment was incorporated against the states.93 The doctrine 
provided colleges and universities with discretion to exercise disciplin-
ary power akin to that of a parent without the fear of litigation.94 
 
89. Id. 
90. Ratliff, supra note 50, at 163 (arguing that even a university’s ability to 
enact reasonable rules should be construed narrowly in order to encourage free 
and open debate and society’s interest in free expression). 
91. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *441 (parents “may also delegate 
part of [their] parental authority . . . to the tutor or schoolmaster . . . who is 
then in loco parentis, and has a such a portion of the power of the parent”); 
Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical 
Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1135, 1144 (1991) (“The 
parent delegated part of his authority to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child. 
The schoolmaster was then in loco parentis and had a partial share of parental 
power.”). 
92. See Waugh v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589, 597 (1915) (holding 
that the University could require a student to renounce his allegiance to a 
fraternity because such a requirement was within the realm of state authority); 
see also Tanton v. McKenney, 197 N.W. 510, 513 (Mich. 1924) (holding that 
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, public school authorities—not the 
courts—have authority to prescribe rules of conduct; the school was acting 
within its purview when refusing plaintiff readmission on the grounds that she 
smoked cigarettes and engaged in other improper conduct). 
93. The Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment against the states in 
1925. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 653, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we 
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among 
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). See 
Webb v. State Univ. of N.Y., 125 F.Supp, 910, 912 (N.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding 
that the Board of Trustees had supervisory authority to ban membership in 
national social organizations). 
94. Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Rights and Responsibilities 
of Modern Universities: Who Assumes the Risk of College Life? 18 
(1999) (“Under the blanket [of in loco parentis], a university was free to exercise 
disciplinary power—or not—with wide discretion and little concern for 
litigation.”). 
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In 1961, the Supreme Court effectively ended the in loco parentis 
doctrine at public colleges and universities when it denied certiorari in 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.95 In that case, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that public colleges 
and universities could not expel students for alleged misconduct with-
out affording them due process rights of notice and an opportunity to 
be heard.96 This decision laid the groundwork for future cases holding 
public colleges and universities legally responsible for infringement of 
student rights.97 
The in loco parentis doctrine remains the basis for imposing a duty 
of care on teachers in the context of K-12 public schools.98 Many of the 
seminal cases on student speech rights occurred in the context of K-12 
public schools.99 It is important to note the impact that age has on any 
discussion of college responsibility for protecting students from exposure 
to ideas they may find offensive. One justification for the demise of the 
in loco parentis doctrine on college and university campuses is that 
student populations were older than 18, the age of majority, and chang-
ing social conditions in the 1960s made the model unworkable.100 College 
and university students are adults who are engaged in an academic 
community whose purported purpose is to foster well-informed citizens. 
“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to 
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”101 The issues that have 
surfaced in relation to President Trump’s campaign and presidency are 
 
95. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
96. Id. at 158–59. 
97. See Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (“Although 
University administrators once had an almost unrestricted power to deal with 
students under the theory of in loco parentis, it is now clear that constitutional 
restraints on authority apply on campuses of state supported [educational] 
institutions with fully as much sanction as public streets and in public parks.”). 
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that university violated 
its students’ First Amendment rights when it denied them recognition as a 
student organization). 
98. Bickel & Lake, supra note 94, at 29 (“[I]n K-12 education today in loco 
parentis is the basis for imposing duties of care . . . .”). 
99. See infra Part IV.  
100. Jackson, supra note 91, at 1148 (“The influx of older students, the lowering of 
the age of majority, and changing social conditions made the common-law 
approach untenable at most institutions.”); Bickel & Lake, supra note 94, 
at 35–36 (“The demise of in loco parentis was hastened by the fact that 
university life in the 1960s (and 1970s) became a focal point of the major social 
issues of the time. . . . The fall of in loco parentis in the 1960s correlated exactly 
with the rise of student economic power and the rise of student civil rights.”). 
101. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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divisive, but stifling speech concerning these issues on college campuses 
runs counter to the purpose of free speech that Justice Brandeis dis-
cussed in his famous concurrence. 
These policy concerns justify a high burden on higher education 
institutions defending restrictions on free speech, an argument echoed 
by the Supreme Court in its decision in Healy v. James.102 In Healy, a 
public college refused to recognize a local chapter of Students for a 
Democratic Society as a student organization.103 SDS was recognized by 
some as a national organization with a reputation of being violent and 
disruptive.104 University officials relied on this national reputation as a 
justification for refusing to recognize SDS.105 The group was barred from 
access to campus facilities because it was not a recognized student 
organization.106 The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration 
of whether the administration permissibly refused to recognize the local 
chapter because SDS allegedly exhibited an “unwillingness to be bound 
by reasonable school rules governing conduct.”107 But the Court agreed 
that to consider campus facilities to be nonpublic fora would be to 
permit broad restrictions on speech incompatible with policy in favor 
of free speech.108 
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution and Civil Justice, FIRE President and CEO Greg 
Lukianoff presented an alternative means of protecting student speech 
on campus.109 Lukianoff lobbied Congress to pass legislation declaring 
all open areas on public campuses to be traditional public fora.110 
 
102. 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (“While a college has a legitimate interest in preventing 
disruption on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the 
safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a ‘heavy burden’ rests 
on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”). 
103. Id. at 179. 
104. Id. at 171. 
105. Id. at 174 n.4. 
106. Id. at 181–82. 
107. Id. at 191–93. 
108. Id. at 194 (“[T]he wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of 
expression and association is not without its costs in terms of the risk to the 
maintenance of civility . . . [but] we reaffirm this Court’s dedication to the 
principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society is 
founded.”). 
109. House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 87, at 21 (statement of Greg 
Lukianoff, First Amendment Specialized Attorney and President and CEO of 
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education). 
110. Id. Lukianoff’s suggestion is modeled on a Virginia law prohibiting public 
colleges and universities from establishing specific free speech zones. Id. at 35 
(written testimony of Greg Lukianoff); Va. Code Ann. § 23.1-401 (2016) 
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“Establishing that outdoor areas on public campuses are traditional 
public for[a] will ensure that our public universities continue to be a 
traditional space for debate aptly and memorably recognized by the 
Supreme Court as ‘peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas.”’”111 Although 
this alternative is more protective of student speech, and would likely 
protect the speech of an outsider like Hershey, only Virginia and 
Missouri have passed these kinds of laws.112 However, under the existing 
public forum doctrine, public colleges and universities that wish to 
curtail student speech in these areas still face a formidable hurdle. 
Because college sidewalks and spaces traditionally used by students 
and student organizations to advertise and express their views, such as 
the OU graffiti wall, are most properly considered limited public fora 
intentionally held open to those students, a state institution that wishes 
to restrict speech in these spaces must prove that it is furthering a 
compelling interest and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. Content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions on 
speech in these spaces must leave open ample alternative means of 
communication. 
IV. Content-Based Restrictions on Speech in Limited 
Public Fora on College Campuses Should Be 
Construed Narrowly 
The Supreme Court does not ignore the special circumstances of 
the school environment in analyzing challenges to restrictions on stu-
dent speech.113 In its most famous opinion concerning student-speech 
rights, however, the Court also affirmed that “students [and] teachers 
[do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”114 This tension between educational 
interests and the right to free speech has led to various outcomes when 
 
(originally enacted as Va. Code Ann. § 23-9.2:13 (2014)) (incorporating strict 
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for all restrictions of speech on 
campus). 
111. House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 87, at 36 (written testimony of Greg 
Lukianoff) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
112. Va. Code Ann. § 23.1-401 (2016) (originally enacted as Va. Code Ann. § 23-
9.2:13 (2014)); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 172.1550 (2015). 
113. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special circumstances of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students.”). 
114. Id. 
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students bring free speech claims in court, some in favor of the stu-
dent115 and some in favor of the regulation.116 This Part will argue that 
absent extreme circumstances, public institutions of higher education 
do not have a legitimate educational interest in restricting speech in 
limited public fora on campus—even political speech that is arguably 
offensive. Although many of the cases discussed in this Part involve 
public school students, rather than college or university students, the 
same First Amendment requirements apply to public colleges and 
universities. In addition, colleges and universities have a weaker 
argument that speech regulations are necessary to their educational 
mission and environment because their students are adults.117 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,118 
three minor students were suspended for wearing armbands in protest 
against the United States’ actions in Vietnam.119 The Supreme Court 
held that the suspension and prohibition on armbands violated the First 
Amendment120 and pointed to several factors relevant to the analysis 
here. First, the restriction was not viewpoint-neutral—it referred spe-
cifically to armbands and not to other kinds of political speech.121 The 
school district adopted the policy under which plaintiffs were suspended 
after it was made aware of a plan to wear armbands in protest against 
 
115. See, e.g., id. (finding in favor of students and holding that the school’s 
suspension of students for wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war was a 
violation of their First Amendment right); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 
1159 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding high school’s policy that student-written materials 
be submitted for approval before they could be distributed on school premises 
was overbroad and violated the students’ First Amendment rights).  
116. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (reversing appellate 
court’s ruling and stating that the appellate court should find that the high 
school did not violate student’s First Amendment rights when it suspended him 
for hanging a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” during a school-
sanctioned event because schools can restrict speech that could reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (holding that a high school may exercise editorial 
discretion over articles published in school-sponsored newspapers as long as its 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that a school could suspend a 
student who delivered a sexually explicit speech in front of his classmates 
because public schools can prohibit vulgar and offensive terms in school). 
117. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (discussing the duty and 
relevance of the in loco parentis imposes on various actors such as teachers and 
how the ages of students affects that duty). 
118. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
119. Id. at 504. 
120. Id. at 514. 
121. Id. at 510–11. 
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the Vietnam War.122 The school district enacted the policy in order to 
suppress this particular viewpoint.123 The Court reiterated the policy 
argument discussed in Part III.124 Freedom of expression is an integral 
part of education because, although the expression of unorthodox opin-
ions may inspire fear, “this sort of hazardous freedom is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans.”125 
For these reasons, the Court held that the school district could restrict 
speech only when it had evidence that the restriction was necessary to 
avoid “material[] and substantial[] interfere[nce] with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”126 
Scholars argue that over time the Court has loosened the standard 
by which it reviews restrictions on free speech, like the one in Tinker, 
by creating more reasons for which schools can restrict speech.127 These 
exceptions are generally content-based and focus on the potential im-
pact on, or harm to, the students in an educational environment.128 
They range from Tinker’s narrow exception for expression that materi-
ally and substantially interferes with school discipline129 to restrictions 
on speech that runs counter to what the state sees as a school’s specific 
educational goal.130 
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,131 a high school student 
delivered a speech to the student body using explicit sexual innuendo 
 
122. Id. at 504. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 512 (“The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a 
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
125. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09. 
126. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
127. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, The Story of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: 
Student Press and the School Censor, in Education Law Stories 221, 235 
(Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008) (discussing Hazelwood, 
its aftermath, and its standard for review of school censorship—“reasonably 
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern”). 
128. See Rosemary C. Salamone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake 
of Hazelwood, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 253, 274–300 (1992) (summarizing post-
Hazelwood decisions in lower courts). 
129. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). 
130. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (finding that a school could suspend 
a student who displayed banner with reference to illegal drug use because part 
of a school’s mission is to educate students about the harmfulness of illegal 
drugs). 
131. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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and was suspended for two days.132 When the student challenged his 
suspension as a violation of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
found for the school; it held that public schools have a right to punish 
students for lewd and indecent speech that undermines their basic edu-
cational mission.133 The Court distinguished this case from Tinker based 
on content and impact. In Tinker, the students were peacefully exer-
cising political speech, whereas the student in Bethel gave a sexually 
explicit speech that arguably caused a greater disruption.134 The court 
did not overrule Tinker; it simply granted schools leeway to restrict 
speech in a broader set of situations. 
Not even two years after its decision in Bethel, the Supreme Court 
decided Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,135 which further 
broadened school authority to restrict student speech when the speech 
is school-sponsored.136 In Hazelwood, student journalists wrote a story 
about teenage pregnancy for their high school newspaper.137 The news-
paper was funded by the school, and students received school credit for 
their participation.138 The principal decided that the newspaper should 
not publish the teenage pregnancy story.139 When the students chal-
lenged his decision as violating their First Amendment rights, the Court 
held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”140 
Although scholars correctly point to this decision as a much greater 
restriction on speech than Tinker,141 it may not apply for the purposes 
of expression in limited public fora on college campuses. Individual stu-
dents and unofficial student groups chalk on campus and utilize spaces 
like the graffiti wall. The rationale for the Court’s decision in Hazelwood 
 
132. Id. at 678. 
133. Id. at 685. 
134. Id. at 680. 
135. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
136. Id. at 271–72 (“A school must be able to set high standards for the student 
speech that is disseminated under its auspices . . . and may refuse to disseminate 
student speech that does not meet those standards.”). 
137. Id. at 263. 
138. Id. at 262, 268. 
139. Id. at 264. 
140. Id. at 273. 
141. See Dupre, supra note 127, at 238 (“It does not have to be the best decision 
under the circumstances, or even a good decision, as long as a court can find 
that there was a ‘legitimate’ concern with respect to education.”). 
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was that the school newspaper in question was part of the curriculum;142 
the same cannot be said of campus graffiti. In addition, part of the 
principal’s justification for refusing to print the article at issue in 
Hazelwood was its mature content and the concern that it would 
promote irresponsible behavior.143 Similar justifications are not compat-
ible with the reality of a college campus populated with adult stu-
dents.144 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit focused 
on this distinction between school-sponsored speech and individual stu-
dent speech in its decision in Burch v. Barker.145 Like Hazelwood, this 
case involved a student-written newspaper, but unlike Hazelwood, the 
paper was not school-sponsored.146 This distinction proved pivotal to 
the court’s decision that the school’s pre-distribution review policy was 
overbroad and must be limited to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions, or satisfy the Tinker rule that the restriction was necessary 
to avoid material and substantial interference with the school’s dis-
ciplinary requirements.147 
Finally, in Morse v. Frederick,148 the Supreme Court expanded the 
concept of a public school’s educational interest in individual student 
speech to its most broad point. In that case, a student displayed a 
banner with the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” on it during a school 
assembly to view the Olympic Torch Relay.149 The Court held that the 
school did not violate the First Amendment when it suspended the stu-
dent because his speech was “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use,” a subject in which the school had a duty to educate stu-
dents.150 
Although, in the years since Tinker, the realm of permissible 
government restrictions on student speech has expanded, public colleges 
 
142. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268. 
143. Id. at 263, 272. 
144. See Jackson, supra note 91, at 1148 (“The influx of older students, the lowering 
of the age of majority, and changing social conditions made the common-law 
approach untenable at most institutions”). 
145. 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988). 
146. Id. at 1150. 
147. Id. at 1158; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1969)) (“Certainly where 
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”). 
148. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
149. Id. at 397. 
150. Id. at 403, 408. 
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and universities remain limited in their ability to restrict speech in 
limited public fora. With regard to the offensive political speech at issue 
on campuses across the country, acceptance of a heckler’s veto of 
student speech runs against both strong public policy concerns151 and 
the Supreme Court’s framework for assessing regulation of student 
speech.152 “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public 
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are 
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”153 For this reason, con-
tent-based restrictions on speech are disfavored, and should be similarly 
disfavored as a matter of campus policy given the special responsibility 
of colleges and universities to educate informed citizens. 
Conclusion 
Open spaces on college campuses such as sidewalks, parks, the OU 
graffiti wall, and the like are properly categorized as limited public fora 
because the universities open these spaces to students for purposes of 
expression and communication. As limited public fora, speech in these 
spaces is protected and, as state actors, colleges and universities may 
only enforce restrictions on this speech that are necessarily drawn to 
serve a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that 
end. Any content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions must be 
reasonable and leave open ample alternative means of communication. 
The debate concerning what public colleges and universities can do 
to restrict speech on campus must occur with the First Amendment 
and public forum doctrine in mind. Although colleges and universities 
may enact speech codes as part of their right to regulate campus dis-
cipline, overly broad speech codes that restrict speech for reasons that 
do not constitute a compelling government interest, such as those that 
effectively permit a heckler’s veto for offensive speech, violate the First 
Amendment. The advent of bias reporting teams represents a similar, 
though student-driven, threat. 
“The University’s interest in an orderly administration of its cam-
pus and facilities in order to implement its educational mission does not 
trump the interest of its students, for whom the University is a com-
munity, in having adequate opportunities and venues available for free 
 
151. See supra Part III (explaining that in educational environments populated by 
adults students, free expression is essential in developing well-informed citizens). 
152. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 189, 215–16 (1983) (“The Court’s reluctance to accept the 
‘heckler’s veto’ . . . seem[s] well-grounded in the central precepts of the first 
amendment.”).  
153. Id. at 215 (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
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expression.”154 Both law and public policy support the categorization of 
open spaces on campus as limited public fora, and public college and 
university administrators must be mindful of these factors as they 
attempt to respond to the current climate calling for increased restric-
tion on student speech. 
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